USA v. Michael Free by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-6-2016 
USA v. Michael Free 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Michael Free" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 960. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/960 
This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                   PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 15-2939  
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL FREE, 
 
                                                             Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(Crim. No. 2-14-cr-00019-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
_______________ 
 
Argued July 12, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES,* SHWARTZ, and RESTREPO, Circuit 
Judges 
 
                                                   
* The Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed Senior Status on 
July 18, 2016. 
2 
 
(Opinion Filed:   October 6, 2016) 
 
 
Martin A. Dietz, Esq. [ARGUED] 
The Mitchell Building 
304 Ross Street, Suite 505 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq. 
Laura S. Irwin, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Office of the United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street, Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 
Attorneys for Appellee   
 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 This case raises the question of how to calculate “loss” 
under the Sentencing Guidelines when a defendant commits 
bankruptcy fraud but all of his creditors receive payment in 
full.   
 
 The defendant, Michael Free, made the bizarre 
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decision to file for bankruptcy even though he had more than 
sufficient assets to pay his debts.  He then, having filed for 
bankruptcy unnecessarily, hid assets worth hundreds of 
thousands of dollars from the Bankruptcy Court.  Free’s 
actions eventually led to criminal charges and convictions for 
multiple counts of bankruptcy fraud.  The oddity of this entire 
situation is best summarized by the fact that, despite all of 
Free’s prevarications, his creditors received 100 cents on the 
dollar from Free’s bankruptcy estate. 
 
 The Sentencing Guidelines increase a fraudster’s 
recommended sentence based on the amount of loss he 
causes, or intends to cause, to his victims.  The District Court 
therefore had to decide whether Free caused or intended to 
cause any loss at all.  Recognizing the novelty of the 
situation, the District Court chose to treat the estimated value 
of the assets that Free concealed from the Bankruptcy Court 
and the amount of debt sought to be discharged as the 
relevant “loss” under the Guidelines.1  In doing so, the 
District Court did not clearly find whether Free intended to 
deprive his creditors of this, or of any, amount.  While we 
appreciate the District Court’s reasoning, we ultimately 
conclude that treating the value of Free’s concealed assets as 
“loss,” at least on the rationale articulated by the District 
Court, is out-of-step with the structure of the Guidelines and 
inconsistent with our own precedent.  Instead, the District 
Court must determine whether Free intended to cause a loss 
to his creditors or what he sought to gain from committing the 
crime, per United States v. Feldman, 338 F.3d 212, 221-23 
(3d Cir. 2003).  A loss amount triggering enhancements under 
                                                   
1 App. Vol. V at 1123. 
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the Sentencing Guidelines on resentencing must reflect a loss 
amount incurred or which Free intended to be incurred.2  
However, even if the District Court finds no such intended 
loss, this is not to say that Free would necessarily receive a 
lower sentence on remand.  Free’s repeated lying to the 
Bankruptcy Court and his manifest disrespect for the judicial 
system may well merit an upward departure or variance from 
the Guidelines.  The District Court may consider whether 
such an upward departure is appropriate. 
 
 For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the 
judgment of the District Court and remand this case for 
resentencing. 
 
I. Background   
A. Free’s Bankruptcy Proceedings  
 
 Free filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in July of 
2010 in his capacity as the sole proprietor of Electra Lighting 
& Electric Company, one of the businesses he owns.  He also 
owns Freedom Firearms, a company that specializes in the 
sale of rare WWII-era guns.  After Free fell behind on 
payments on two business-related properties, the lender 
purchased them in foreclosure, and Free purportedly filed for 
                                                   
2 Feldman, 338 F.3d at 215 (“The determination of actual 
loss is relevant to the sentencing enhancement, since loss 
under the Sentencing Guidelines is the greater of the actual 
loss caused by the defendant's illegal actions or the amount of 
loss the defendant intended to cause.”).  Thus, the Guidelines’ 
enhancements treat actual and intended loss on par. 
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bankruptcy in an effort to “stay” the sale and “possibly to 
work out an agreement with” the lender.3 
 
 Filing a bankruptcy petition requires a debtor to 
complete several forms.  These include “Schedule A,” which 
requires an accounting of the debtor’s real estate assets, and 
“Schedule B,” which requires an accounting of the debtor’s 
personal property.  A debtor certifies that both documents are 
correct under penalty of perjury.  On Free’s Schedule A, he 
disclosed over $1.3 million in real estate assets.4  On Free’s 
                                                   
3 App. Vol. V at 1107, 1160; Free Br. at 4 (“S&T Bank 
began foreclosure proceedings against two business 
properties owned by Appellant, Michael Free. . . .  Because 
he feared that he would lose his business due to the 
foreclosure actions and the subsequent sheriff’s sales, Mr. 
Free, through counsel, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
. . . .”).  However, the District Court did not make a factual 
finding accepting Free’s and his counsel’s assertion that he 
filed bankruptcy for this reason.  See App. Vol. V at 1123 
(“The Court draws the inference that Mr. Free had his reasons 
for both filing and persisting in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
[and] that Mr. Free had his reasons that were of value to him 
in not causing any of his lawyers to attempt to resolve the 
matter earlier . . . .”).  The District Court in fact found Free’s 
testimony wanting.  See App. Vol. V at 1125 (“The Court had 
the opportunity to observe Mr. Free’s testimony in Court 
today, at the time of sentencing, and the Court found, 
essentially, none of it to be credible at all.”). 
4 App. Vol. IV at 904.  Free listed a secured claim against 
one of those assets in the amount of $303,251.  Id.  
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Schedule B, he listed $368,990 worth of personal property, 
including 27 firearms collectively valued at $250,000.5  The 
District Court later concluded that, at the time he filed for 
bankruptcy, Free had liabilities of approximately $671,166, 
meaning that his disclosed assets exceeded his debts by 
several hundred thousand dollars.6 
 
 Free initially filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, which permits a debtor to reorganize 
his or her debts.7  The Bankruptcy Court later converted 
                                                   
5 Id. at 905-910. 
6 The District Court did not make a factual finding as to 
Free’s actual net worth at the time he filed for bankruptcy, 
which remains somewhat mysterious given the extent of 
Free’s fraud on the Bankruptcy Court.  Given that Free and 
the government plainly disagree about the relevant 
calculations, we decline to venture our own estimate here.   
7 See, e.g., In re Schaitz, 913 F.2d 452, 453 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“Chapter 13 provides, for individuals, a counterpart to 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the 
reorganization of bankrupt enterprises in lieu of their 
liquidation.  Instead of the trustee’s seizing and selling the 
bankrupt’s nonexempt assets, as in a Chapter 7 proceeding, 
under Chapter 13 (as under Chapter 11) the bankrupt 
proposes a plan for the repayment of his debts out of future 
income.”). 
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Free’s proceeding into a Chapter 7 action,8 meaning that the 
focus shifted from “confirmation and completion of a 
reorganization plan”9 to “liquidation of assets and distribution 
to creditors.”10  In a Chapter 7 case, “the United States 
Trustee appoints an impartial case trustee to administer the 
case and liquidate the debtor’s nonexempt assets.”11  The 
trustee in this case was James Walsh,12 an attorney based in 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania.   
 
 One of the events that occurs early in a Chapter 7 
                                                   
8 Order, In re Michael J. Free d/b/a Electra Lighting & 
Elec. Co., No. 2-10-bk-25460 (CMB), ECF No. 71 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2011) (hereinafter “Free Bankruptcy,” with 
ECF filing dates in parentheses).  The Court converted the 
proceeding after Free failed to file a payment plan.  Id.; 
Proceeding Memorandum, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 70 
(Jan. 31, 2011). 
9 In re Michael, 699 F.3d 305, 306 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012). 
10 Id. at 306. 
11 In re Messina, 687 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 2 
Bankruptcy Law Manual § 10:9 (5th ed. updated through 
2016) (explaining that, in a Chapter 7 case “where there are 
assets for distribution to creditors . . . the trustee serves as the 
representative of the estate aggressively looking for ways to 
maximize assets that can be distributed to unsecured 
creditors”). 
12 Notice of Appointment of Interim Trustee and 
Determination of Trustee Bond, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 
75 (Feb. 2, 2011). 
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proceeding is a creditors’ meeting.  During Free’s creditors’ 
meeting, which took place in March of 2011, Free indicated 
that he was “trying to” sell weapons he owned by “put[ting] 
them on the internet.”13  Walsh immediately told Free to stop:  
Trustee Walsh: You can’t sell them, they’re 
now the bankruptcy estate’s and only I can sell 
them with the court approval.  So do not, under 
any circumstances, sell any of these weapons.  
Don’t sell any of the real estate, don’t sell any 
of the inventory.  It’s all within the control of 
the court at this point in time. 
Michael J. Free: Ok, at least at this point, from 
my understanding though, is [sic] a moot point 
because none of the firearms have been sold as 
of yet. 
Trustee Walsh: Yeah, but I’m just . . .  
Michael J. Free: I understand[.] 
Trustee Walsh: So there’s no misunderstanding 
of “I didn’t know”, nothing can be sold or 
transferred without court approval brought on a 
motion by myself.  Ok? 
                                                   
13 App. Vol. V at 977 (Tr. of Mar. 2, 2011 creditors’ 
meeting).   
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Michael J. Free: Alright[.]14 
 
 Over the course of the ensuing months, Free became 
increasingly uncooperative with Walsh and progressively 
more disrespectful towards the Bankruptcy Court.  Less than 
a month after the creditors’ meeting, Walsh asked the 
Bankruptcy Court to compel Free to turn over certain assets 
and to cease operation of his businesses, both of which Free 
had refused to do.15  On another occasion, Free raised 
suspicions by purchasing several of his own assets during a 
court-supervised auction, falsely claiming that he had the 
money to do so through the generosity of friends and 
relatives.  In fact, Free actually made such purchases with the 
proceeds of his surreptitious sales of weapons, after he had 
specifically been told he could not sell his weapons.16  Free 
                                                   
14 Id.  
15 Trustee’s Compl. to Compel Turnover of Property of the 
Bankruptcy Estate, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 98 (Mar. 30, 
2011). 
16 App. Vol. II at 239–40 (discussing Free having purchased 
his own properties at auction); App. Vol. III at 447–48 (“I 
[Walsh] said: Where’s this money coming from?  And 
[Free’s] response was in open court on the record that it was 
coming from his family and friends.”).  See also Order 
Confirming Sales of Personal Property Free and Divested of 
Liens, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 134 (July 20, 2011) 
(indicating that Free purchased over $30,000 worth of 
inventory, including $8,500 worth of gun parts and 
ammunition).   
10 
 
also refused to cooperate with Walsh’s efforts to obtain 
paperwork that was necessary to sell the firearms that Free 
had disclosed in Schedule B of his bankruptcy petition.17 
 
 Convinced that Free had concealed assets and violated 
court orders, Walsh filed a motion for sanctions in October of 
2011.18  The Bankruptcy Court granted Walsh’s motion in 
February of 2012, ordering Free to provide a full accounting 
of his assets or face monetary penalties.19  The Bankruptcy 
Court also threatened to incarcerate Free if he failed to 
comply.20  In doing so, it expressed its profound frustration 
with Free’s conduct:  
                                                   
17 In re Free, 466 B.R. 48, 55 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012). 
18 Mot. for Finding of Civil Contempt, Imposition of 
Sanctions, for Authority to “Junk” Assets, and Request for 
Expedited Hearing, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 180 (Oct. 17, 
2011). 
19 In re Free, 466 B.R. at 61. 
20 Id. at 62 (“If the Court is convinced that compliance can 
be obtained only by incarceration, we will not hesitate to 
order the Debtor to be taken into custody.”). 
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[Free] has acted willfully, vexatiously, 
wantonly, and in bad faith.  His inappropriate 
conduct has negatively impacted the entire 
bankruptcy case. . . .  [He] has persisted in his 
willful misconduct despite the attempts of three 
bankruptcy judges to dissuade him from future 
misconduct.  The failure to cooperate and 
comply while [Free] is facing sanctions for civil 
contempt is shocking to the Court.21 
 
 Events finally came to a head a few weeks later when 
Walsh filed an emergency motion for civil contempt.22  
Walsh claimed that Free had, in various ways, failed to 
comply with the Bankruptcy Court’s February 2012 orders.  
In particular, Walsh said that he had recently been contacted 
by a man who had tried to purchase a WWII-era firearm from 
Free for a price of $13,500.  The man told Walsh that Free 
had sold other firearms since entering Chapter 7 
proceedings.23  Walsh responded by asking the Bankruptcy 
Court to enter an order directing a third-party auction 
company “to take physical possession of [Free’s guns] as 
                                                   
21 Id. at 56. 
22 Emergency Mot. for Finding of Civil Contempt, 
Imposition of Sanctions, for Authority for Liquidator to Take 
Possession of Weapons, Status Report, and Request for 
Expedited Hearing, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 291 (Mar. 19, 
2012). 
23 Id. at 4–5. 
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soon as possible.”24  
 
 The Bankruptcy Court convened a hearing on the 
matter, after which it entered an order directing the local 
sheriff “to take possession of all of [Free’s] firearms.”25  A 
few days later, on March 26, 2012, Free filed a declaration 
with the Bankruptcy Court in which he claimed, again under 
penalty of perjury, that he had not “sold or transferred” any 
estate assets—including firearms—since his bankruptcy case 
was converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding.26  By the time 
Free filed his declaration, the government claims that he had 
sold at least 20 firearms worth more than $400,000.27 
 
 Local sheriff’s deputies, acting on the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order, searched Free’s house on March 27, 2012—the 
day after Free filed his declaration with the Bankruptcy 
Court.  They found 49 guns in various locations throughout 
                                                   
24 Id. at 6. 
25 Order at 2, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 303 (Mar. 23, 
2012). 
26 Decl. of Michael J. Free, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 314 
(Mar. 26, 2012). 
27 App. Vol. II at 180 (in which Walsh testified that Free 
“had purported to sell guns to third parties and had collected 
substantial sums of money from those third parties for the 
guns”); App. Vol. V at 958–65 (summarizing evidence of 
Free’s gun sales between February 2011 and March 2012).   
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the home.28  When they questioned Free, he said he had no 
additional firearms in his possession.29  Later that afternoon, 
Free filed a revised declaration with the Bankruptcy Court 
that included a handwritten list of dozens of firearms, along 
with a copy of the Schedule B from his original bankruptcy 
petition.30  Because Free did not list any serial numbers in 
these two documents, Walsh was unable to determine the 
degree of overlap between the two lists.31   
 
 The depth of Free’s fraud on the Bankruptcy Court 
became increasingly apparent in the ensuing months.  In April 
of 2012, Walsh filed a status report in which he informed the 
Bankruptcy Court that Free “ha[d] received at least 
$90,000.00 in funds from third parties whom he offered to 
sell firearms which constitute property of the estate during the 
pendency of this Chapter 7 proceeding.”32  The day after 
Walsh filed his status report, the Bankruptcy Court ordered 
the United States Marshal to take Free into custody until such 
                                                   
28 App. Vol. III at 518; see also App. Vol. V at 1166–69 
(Westmoreland County Sheriff’s Office Confiscation Forms 
from Mar. 27, 2012 search of Free’s home).   
29 App. Vol. III at 486 (testimony of Deputy Sheriff Alex 
Turcheck).  
30 Submission Pursuant to Orders of the Court Dated Feb. 
27, 2012 & Mar. 23, 2012, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 315 
(Mar. 27, 2012); see also App. Vol. V at 943–49 (same). 
31 App. Vol. II at 184–89. 
32 Status Report of Chapter 7 Trustee Dated Apr. 2, 2012 at 
6, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 330 (Apr. 2, 2012). 
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time as he paid over $26,000 in fines and rent then owing to 
the Bankruptcy Court and to the estate.33   
 
 It was around this time that the FBI became involved.  
Having reviewed certain firearms registration records, FBI 
agents came to believe that Free was continuing to conceal 
firearms from the Bankruptcy Court.34  The FBI obtained a 
warrant to search Free’s residence a second time.  During that 
search, which took place in March of 2013, federal agents 
discovered an additional 55 firearms.35 
B. Free’s Criminal Prosecution  
 
 Federal prosecutors eventually initiated a criminal case 
against Free for committing bankruptcy fraud.  The grand 
jury returned an indictment in January of 2014 that charged 
Free with six counts relating to (i) false statements in Free’s 
Schedule A relating to real property; (ii) false statements in 
Free’s Schedule B relating to his ownership of firearms; (iii) 
false statements in Free’s declaration of March 26, 2012; (iv)  
false statements in Free’s supplemental declaration of 
March 27, 2012; (v) concealment of additional assets from 
the Bankruptcy Court, including real property, motor 
vehicles, farm implements, and cash; and (vi) false statements 
that Free made under oath at the March 2011 creditors’ 
meeting.36 
                                                   
33 Order at 2, Free Bankruptcy, ECF No. 337 (Apr. 3, 2012). 
34 App. Vol. III at 518–19. 
35 Id. at 532-35, 539. 
36 App. Vol. II at 1–8. 
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 Counts I through IV arose under 18 U.S.C. § 157, 
which outlaws various forms of bankruptcy fraud.37  
Counts V and VI arose under 18 U.S.C. § 152, which makes 
it a crime to conceal assets or to commit perjury in the 
context of a bankruptcy proceeding.38  Both statutes set a 
                                                   
37 18 U.S.C. § 157 states that “[a] person who, having 
devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud 
and for the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme 
or artifice or attempting to do so— 
(1) files a petition under title 11, including a fraudulent 
involuntary petition under section 303 of such title;  
(2) files a document in a proceeding under title 11; or  
(3) makes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or 
promise concerning or in relation to a proceeding under title 
11, at any time before or after the filing of the petition, or in 
relation to a proceeding falsely asserted to be pending under 
such title,  
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both.” 
38 18 U.S.C. § 152 has nine subsections.  Count V, which 
related to the concealment of assets, charged Free with 
violating subsections (1) and (2).  Subsection (1) makes it 
unlawful to “knowingly and fraudulently conceal[] from a 
custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court 
charged with the control or custody of property, or, in 
connection with a case under title 11, from creditors or the 
United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of 
a debtor.”  Subsection (2) makes it unlawful to “knowingly 
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maximum term of imprisonment of five years for each 
violation. 
 
 After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Free on all 
counts. 
C. Free’s Sentencing Hearing  
 
 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a bankruptcy 
fraudster’s recommended term of imprisonment depends on a 
number of factors.39  “Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines 
governs the calculation of the offense level for crimes 
involving, among other things, fraud and deceit.”40  
Subsection (a) of that provision “provides the base offense 
level, which is either seven, if the offense has a maximum 
term of imprisonment of twenty years or more, or six.”41  
                                                                                                                  
 
and fraudulently make[] a false oath or account in or in 
relation to any case under title 11.”  Count VI, which related 
to false statements made at the March 2011 creditors’ 
meeting, was brought under subsection (2) alone. 
39 The District Court relied on the 2014 edition of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, as do we.  See Gov’t Br. at 19 n.2.   
40 United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1238 (2016).  The current § 2B1.1 of 
the Guidelines incorporates provisions previously located at § 
2F1.1.  That section “was deleted and consolidated with § 
2B1.1 in 2001.”  United States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 138 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
41 Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179. 
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Subsection (b) “provides an extensive list of adjustments for 
offense-specific characteristics,” including “the adjustment 
for the amount of loss.”42  As the loss amount increases, so 
too does the defendant’s offense level. 
 
 At Free’s sentencing hearing, the District Court 
therefore needed to make a determination as to the amount of 
loss caused by Free’s crimes.  The issue here is that, by the 
time of Free’s sentencing, it had become clear that Free had 
(and perhaps always had) sufficient assets to pay off his 
creditors in full.  Given this odd factual posture, the parties 
disputed the correct loss amount under the Guidelines.   
 
 The government argued that the District Court should 
take at least three numbers into account to calculate loss, all 
relating to the value of Free’s concealed guns.  First, it 
identified fifteen firearms, valued at $357,460, that Free 
unlawfully sold during the pendency of his bankruptcy 
proceedings.43  Second, it pointed to the fact that, at an 
auction supervised by the Bankruptcy Court, ten additional 
guns concealed by Free were sold for $640,000 (although, by 
the date of the sentencing hearing, that sale had not yet been 
finalized).  Third, it asked the District Court to consider an 
additional cache of guns that had not yet been sold at auction 
and remained in the FBI’s possession.  Based on an appraisal 
                                                   
42 Id. 
43 App. Vol. V at 1048.  The District Court pointed out that 
Free presumably used the proceeds from these sales to buy 
his own assets back during certain court-supervised auctions.  
See id. at 1053–54. 
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from the same buyer who purchased the second lot of guns, 
the government estimated the value of the unsold lot at 
$833,000.  Altogether, these figures indicated that Free 
concealed firearms worth approximately $1.83 million from 
the Bankruptcy Court.   
 
 Free’s counsel objected to the $833,000 figure on the 
ground that the government produced its appraisal estimate at 
the last minute and he had not yet had a chance to investigate 
the appraiser’s credentials.  The District Court sustained the 
objection and discounted the $833,000 figure in its 
calculations. 
 
 Even so, the government argued that Free should have 
16 levels added to his offense level.  It derived this figure 
from the Sentencing Guidelines’ stepwise scheme for 
calculating loss.  If a fraudster’s conduct causes over 
$400,000 but less than $1 million in loss, the Guidelines add 
14 levels to his offense level.44  If the fraudster’s conduct 
causes over $1 million but less than $2.5 million in loss, the 
Guidelines add 16 levels to his offense level.45  Thus, even if 
the District Court were disinclined to credit the $833,000 
figure as the correct valuation for Free’s as-of-yet-unsold 
guns, the value of the first two groups of guns was $997,640.  
The government asserted that, whatever its value, the third lot 
of guns was worth enough to push Free’s loss figure past the 
$1 million threshold necessary to trigger a 16-level increase 
                                                   
44 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). 
45 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). 
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in his offense level.46 
 
 Free’s position, by contrast, was that he “should only 
be held accountable for a loss amount that’s consistent with 
what he could have deprived creditors of receiving back 
during the bankruptcy.”47  Since all of Free’s creditors were 
paid back in full, Free asserted that the loss amount in his 
case was, in fact, $0.   
 
 In a colloquy with Free’s counsel, the District Court 
challenged Free’s arguments in favor of a $0 loss calculation.  
It pointed out that courts rely on honesty from litigants:  
                                                   
46 App. Vol. V at 1064 (“That's the only argument I’m 
making, Judge.  That to the extent the Court considers dollar 
value of relevance, we are way past the million dollar 
threshold for whatever consideration the Court wants to give 
to that fact.”).   
47 Id. at 1070.   
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But then, as I thought about it, read Feldman, 
one of the things that we rely on people doing 
is, when they come to Court, whether it’s this 
Court or the Bankruptcy, particularly, the 
Bankruptcy Court, they have to deal the cards 
faced up, because we don’t have a cavalry of 
investigators to go out snooping around 
everyone that runs through the tens of 
thousands of bankruptcy cases just filed here in 
Pittsburgh, let alone around the country.  We 
absolutely rely on people telling the truth 
because we can’t ferret it out any other way.48 
 
 In addition, the District Court expressed the view that, 
under the Guidelines, there is a difference between a debtor 
who conceals $100 in assets and a debtor who conceals 
$1 million in assets.  According to the District Court, the 
Guidelines reflect a policy judgment that the second debtor 
should receive a harsher sentence than the first.49  Free’s 
counsel disagreed.  He argued that the Guidelines are 
concerned primarily with the amount of harm inflicted or 
intended to be inflicted on victims of crime.  And here, the 
only conceivable victims were Free’s creditors—who, it 
turned out, sustained no loss at all.50   
                                                   
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 1082 (“[A]ren’t the Sentencing Guidelines permitted 
and for the reasons making [sic] distinctions between people 
that hide a lot and people that don’t hide very much?”). 
50 Id. at 1072.   
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 Walsh, the bankruptcy trustee, also testified at Free’s 
sentencing hearing.  He said that Free’s dishonesty was the 
worst he had ever seen in his more than 37 years of practice 
in the bankruptcy courts.51  In his view, “at virtually every 
single step of the way . . . Free has been an obstructionist.”52  
But Walsh also testified that, once Free’s bankruptcy 
proceedings had concluded, there would likely be more than 
enough assets to satisfy all creditors’ claims.53 
 
 Free also spoke on his own behalf.  He claimed that he 
filed for bankruptcy in order to “stay [a] sheriff sale” on one 
of his properties, not to discharge any debts.54  He also said 
that his bankruptcy attorney told him that it would be 
acceptable not to disclose all of his firearms on his 
bankruptcy schedules.55 
 
 The District Court made two key statements regarding 
its loss calculation.  First, it concluded that “it was certainly 
Mr. Free’s intention to conceal from the United States 
Bankruptcy Court and to cause a loss, to the extent that it was 
                                                   
51 Id. at 1092. 
52 Id. at 1091. 
53 Id. at 1096.   
54 Id. at 1107, 1109 (in which Free stated that he told his 
lawyer that he “wanted everybody paid, right from the 
beginning,” and “did not want any kind of a write-off or 
anything”).   
55 Id. at 1108–09. 
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needed, materially in excess of a million dollars.”56  The 
District Court did not, however, explicitly state that Free 
intended to cause pecuniary harm to his creditors.  Nor did 
the District Court clarify its understanding of Free’s intent at 
the time he filed for bankruptcy.  Instead, the District Court 
made the following statement:  
 
The Court draws the inference that Mr. Free had 
his reasons for both filing and persisting in the 
bankruptcy proceeding, [and] that Mr. Free had 
his reasons that were of value to him in not 
causing any of his lawyers to attempt to resolve 
the matter earlier . . . .  But all of the testimony 
at the trial . . . demonstrates that Mr. Free knew 
and wanted to be in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
that he, he viewed assets that he needed to 
protect from the bankruptcy proceeding, and 
combined with those that he did disclose in the 
bankruptcy proceeding were well north of a 
million dollars.57 
 
  In explaining its loss calculation, the District Court 
stated that it “found . . . none of [Free’s testimony] to be 
credible at all,” and said that Free’s answers were “evasive” 
and “non-sensible.”58  The District Court underscored its view 
that the Guidelines reflect the commonsense proposition “that 
                                                   
56 Id. at 1122.   
57 Id. at 1123.   
58 Id. at 1125.   
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there would be a higher loss calculation when there is a 
significantly higher amount of assets that are concealed from 
the Bankruptcy Court, even if on reflection it could have been 
completely unnecessary from a logical and a common sense 
standpoint to conceal [them].”59  The District Court also 
characterized the victim of Free’s fraud as “the judicial 
system of the United States,” not his creditors.60 
 
 Somewhat curiously, even though the District Court 
concluded that the loss amount in Free’s case was more than 
$1 million, it only added 14 levels to Free’s base offense level 
of 6.  That 14-level enhancement is consistent with a loss 
amount of between of between $400,000 and $1 million,61 
whereas a loss amount greater than $1 million normally 
triggers a 16-level enhancement.62  The discrepancy appears 
to have arisen because the Presentence Investigation Report 
only recommended a 14-level enhancement, and the District 
Court tentatively adopted that recommendation before Free’s 
sentencing hearing63 and then adhered to its prior decision at 
the hearing itself.64 
 
                                                   
59 Id. at 1126. 
60 Id. at 1140.   
61 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). 
62 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). 
63 App. Vol. V at 984.   
64 Id. at 1045 (“The Court will adopt its tentative findings as 
they have been corrected on the record today . . . .”).   
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 In addition to the 14-level enhancement resulting from 
the District Court’s loss calculation, the Guidelines state that 
“[i]f the offense involved . . . a misrepresentation or other 
fraudulent action during the course of a bankruptcy 
proceeding,” or “a violation of any prior, specific judicial or 
administrative order,” the district court should “increase [the 
offense level] by 2 levels.”65  The District Court applied this 
2-level enhancement as well.66   
 
 Combining Free’s base offense level of 6, his loss 
causation enhancement of 14, and his 2-level enhancement 
for bankruptcy fraud, Free’s total offense level was 22.  This 
resulted in a Guidelines Range of 41–51 months’ 
imprisonment on each count.67  The District Court then varied 
downward, concluding that an offense level of 16 was “more 
appropriate” given the facts of Free’s case.68  This led to a 
Guidelines range of 21–27 months’ imprisonment.69  The 
District Court ultimately sentenced Free to 24 months’ 
incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, and to a 
term of supervised release of three years.70 
                                                   
65 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B), (C).  Under this provision, the 
defendant’s offense level increases to 10 if it is not that high 
already.  In this case, Free’s offense level was already 20, 
leading only to the 2-level enhancement.   
66 App. Vol. V at 1127–28. 
67 Id. at 1128.   
68 Id. at 1143. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1145.   
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D. Free’s Motion for Bail Pending Appeal  
 
 About a month after his sentencing, Free filed a 
motion for bail pending appeal.  Free argued that bail was 
appropriate because our Court might ultimately agree with his 
view of how to calculate loss under the Guidelines.  The 
District Court granted the motion three months later, 
concluding that Free had raised a “significant” question of 
law.71     
  
 The District Court reiterated that, “[b]ased on the 
record developed at trial and at sentencing, it does not appear 
that any creditor will suffer any financial loss at all, and all 
administrative expenses of the bankruptcy will be paid, with 
some assets left over.”72  The District Court also adhered to 
the view, previously articulated at Free’s sentencing hearing, 
that “the Sentencing Guidelines reflect[] a policy position that 
the sentence should be greater when one attempts to conceal 
greater assets in a bankruptcy proceeding—even when the 
actual pecuniary harm to the creditors, viewed in hindsight, 
was less than the amount concealed.”73  Thus, while “Free’s 
deceit plainly harmed the integrity of the judicial process—
and this Court articulated that as the principal basis for the 
sentence imposed—it did not, however, appear to actually 
cause pecuniary harm [to] his creditors or anyone other than, 
                                                   
71 United States v. Free, No. 2:14-CR-0019 (MRH), 2015 
WL 8784738, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2015) (quoting United 
States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985)).   
72 Id.    
73 Id. at *3. 
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perhaps, him.”74 
 
 Importantly, the District Court concluded that the loss 
calculation issue could alter Free’s sentence.  It noted that, 
without the 14-level increase in Free’s offense triggered by its 
prior loss calculation, Free’s offense level would have been 
10, “lead[ing] to an advisory Guideline range of 6–12 
months.”75  Even though this Guidelines range would not be 
binding, the District Court stated that it was entitled to “due 
and serious consideration.”76  And, while the District Court 
was “hesitant to engage in any concrete forecast of what 
would actually happen at a resentencing,”77 it also stated that 
it was “‘likely’ . . . that a new sentence [would] be shorter 
than 11–13 months if Mr. Free’s ‘zero’ loss theory [were to] 
carr[y] the day.”78 
 
 Accordingly, Free has been out on bail pending 
resolution of this appeal. 
                                                   
74 Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. at *5; see also supra note 65 (explaining that 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9) increases a bankruptcy fraudster’s 
minimum offense level to 10). 
76 Free, 2015 WL 8784738, at *5 (citing United States v. 
Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 211–15 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
77 Id. at *6 n.11. 
78 Id. at *6.   
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II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review  
 
 This is a direct appeal from a criminal conviction and 
sentence.  Free timely filed a notice of appeal, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
 
 Free brings both a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence and a challenge to his sentence.  “In reviewing a 
jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, we ‘must 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government and affirm the judgment if there is substantial 
evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”79   
 
 In a fraud case, the government bears the burden of 
establishing the amount of loss for purposes of sentencing by 
a preponderance of the evidence.80  When calculating the loss 
amount, a district court “need only make a reasonable 
estimate of the loss” incurred.81  We review a district court’s 
factual findings at sentencing for clear error, including factual 
findings supporting “the loss calculations . . . under 
                                                   
79 United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 
1992)). 
80 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 310 (3d Cir. 2011), 
as amended (Sept. 15, 2011) (citing United States v. Jimenez, 
513 F.3d 62, 86 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
81 United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app. n. 3(C)).   
28 
 
Guidelines § 2B1.1.”82  Alternatively, “[w]hen the calculation 
of the correct Guidelines range turns on an interpretation of 
‘what constitutes loss’ under the Guidelines, we exercise 
plenary review.”83   
 
III. Discussion 
 
 Free challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence 
and the District Court’s subsequent sentence.  We will 
consider each issue in turn.   
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence  
 
 With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, Free’s 
primary contention is that, since his creditors received full 
payment as a result of his bankruptcy proceedings, he cannot 
properly be said to have devised or participated in any 
fraudulent scheme.  While Free admits that his dishonesty 
may have been “potentially contemptible conduct in the 
bankruptcy matter,” he insists that his repeated lying does not 
necessarily “establish [the] requisite mens rea [to show] that 
he devised a scheme to defraud or intended to defraud 
anyone.”84  This argument is too clever by half. 
  
 Free was convicted of four counts under 18 U.S.C. § 
157.  “One commits bankruptcy fraud under § 157 by (1) 
devising a scheme to defraud, and (2) filing a document in a 
                                                   
82 Dullum, 560 F.3d at 137. 
83 Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179 (quoting Fumo, 655 F.3d at 309). 
84 Free Br. at 27.   
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bankruptcy proceeding or making [a] false or fraudulent 
statement in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the fraudulent scheme.”85  
There is ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
have concluded that Free did precisely that.  What’s more, no 
fraudulent losses need to occur for a debtor to violate § 157; 
“[f]iling itself is the forbidden act.”86  Whatever else Free did, 
the evidence that he filed fraudulent documents with the 
Bankruptcy Court is overwhelming. 
 
 Likewise, counts V and VI involve violations of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 152(1) and 152(2).  We have said that a debtor 
violates § 152(1) by failing to “reveal the existence of his 
assets to the United States Trustee.”87  And, by its plain 
terms, § 152(2) outlaws “knowingly and fraudulently 
mak[ing] a false oath” in relation to a bankruptcy case.88  
Here again, the evidence of Free’s guilt is indisputable.  
 
 More generally, Free’s argument depends on the 
proposition that debtors have blanket immunity to lie to the 
Bankruptcy Court so long as there are no creditors who suffer 
any out-of-pocket losses.  Free points us to no authority for 
                                                   
85 United States v. Knight, 800 F.3d 491, 505 (8th Cir. 
2015). 
86 United States v. DeSantis, 237 F.3d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
87 United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 199 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
88 18 U.S.C. § 152(2).   
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such a remarkable proposition, and we are confident in 
rejecting it. 
B. The Proper Loss Calculation in the Present 
Case  
 
 We turn next to Free’s challenge to his sentence, and 
in particular to his contention that the District Court erred in 
its calculation of “loss” under the Sentencing Guidelines.  
 
 There are essentially two ways to think about loss in 
this case.  Under one view, the goal of the Sentencing 
Guidelines is to calibrate a fraudster’s punishment so that it 
reflects the extent of the economic harm inflicted or intended 
to be inflicted on the fraudster’s victims.  This is Free’s 
position.  Free argues that there were no victims here because 
Free’s creditors received 100 cents on the dollar in Free’s 
bankruptcy proceeding.   
 
 Under the alternative view proffered by the 
government, the Guidelines provide district courts with broad 
discretion to conceptualize the harm caused by a defendant 
based on the facts of any particular case.  In the context of 
bankruptcy fraud, then, it is appropriate to think about harm 
in terms of the value of any assets that a debtor conceals from 
the bankruptcy court—not only because concealing assets can 
harm creditors, but also because it harms the integrity of the 
judicial system itself.  The District Court ultimately embraced 
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this view.89  
 
 We begin with the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, 
which we think favor Free’s argument.  The application notes 
define the following key terms:  
 Actual loss:  “Actual loss” means the 
reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that 
resulted from the offense. 
 Intended Loss:  “Intended loss” (I) means 
the pecuniary harm that was intended to 
result from the offense; and (II) includes 
intended pecuniary harm that would have 
been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as 
in a government sting operation, or an 
insurance fraud in which the claim exceeded 
the insured value). 
                                                   
89 The District Court wrote that “[w]hile Free’s deceit 
plainly harmed the integrity of the judicial process—and this 
Court articulated that as the principal basis for the sentence 
imposed—it did not, however, appear to actually cause 
pecuniary harm [to] his creditors or anyone other than, 
perhaps, him.”  Free, 2015 WL 8784738, at *2 (second 
alteration added). 
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 Pecuniary harm:  “Pecuniary harm” means 
harm that is monetary or that otherwise is 
readily measurable in money.  Accordingly, 
pecuniary harm does not include emotional 
distress, harm to reputation, or other non-
economic harm.90 
 
 In our view, the application notes to § 2B1.1, which 
discuss these definitions in further detail, suggest that the 
District Court’s rationale for Free’s sentence was inconsistent 
with the structure of the Guidelines.91  The notes focus 
extensively on pecuniary harm, explicitly stating that the 
proper way to punish a defendant who causes non-pecuniary 
but otherwise serious harm is to impose an upward 
                                                   
90 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app. n. 3(A)(i), (ii), (iii) (punctuation 
modified). The current sentencing guidelines, as revised in 
2015, narrows “intended loss” to “pecuniary harm that the 
defendant purposely sought to inflict,” while still including 
intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or 
unlikely to occur. 
91 We have said that “the Sentencing Guidelines 
commentary ‘is akin to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
legislative rules[,]’ [and] we will give the application notes 
‘controlling weight’ unless the commentary ‘violate[s] the 
Constitution or a federal statute[]’ or ‘is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.’”  United States v. Lianidis, 
599 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2010) (all alterations in original 
except second) (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 
45 (1993)). 
33 
 
departure.92  This guidance implies that the gravamen of any 
loss calculation is concrete, monetary harm to a real-world 
victim.  In other words, while it may indeed be appropriate to 
punish a bankruptcy fraudster more severely when that person 
conceals assets of greater value, the Guidelines seem to 
indicate that, in the absence of any pecuniary harm to a 
victim, the mechanism for realizing that goal is an upward 
departure rather than a more severe loss calculation in the 
first instance. 
 
 Our Court’s leading case regarding loss calculation 
and bankruptcy fraud is United States v. Feldman.93  The 
defendant there, like Free, committed fraud on the bankruptcy 
court by concealing large quantities of assets.94  His main 
argument on appeal, like Free’s, focused on the lack of any 
concrete harm or intended pecuniary harm to his creditors.  
Feldman claimed that because most of his concealed assets 
consisted of property he owned jointly with his wife that, by 
operation of law, was not subject to execution by his 
creditors, his decision to hide those properties from the 
                                                   
92 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app. n. 20(A) (“There may be cases in 
which the offense level determined under this guideline 
substantially understates the seriousness of the offense.  In 
such cases, an upward departure may be warranted.”).  One of 
the proffered examples where an upward departure might be 
merited is a case where “[t]he offense caused or risked 
substantial non-monetary harm.”  Id. app. n. 20(A)(ii).   
93 338 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003). 
94 Id. at 214 (“Feldman filed a bankruptcy petition in which 
he vastly understated the amount of property he owned.”).   
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bankruptcy court inflicted little or no actual loss within the 
meaning of the Guidelines.95 
   
 The Feldman Court began its analysis by observing 
that loss calculations under the Guidelines can turn on either 
actual loss or intended loss.  Thus, “even if Feldman could 
not have caused any loss by concealing exempt assets, he 
could still be subject to a sentencing enhancement if he 
thought he would cause a loss by concealing the assets.”96  
The government, by contrast, urged the Feldman Court to go 
even further by adopting “a bright line rule that ‘[i]ntended 
loss includes the value of assets concealed from creditors and 
the bankruptcy court.’”97  We declined to do so, stating that 
the key question in these cases is not the value of the assets 
concealed, but rather “what [a defendant] sought to gain from 
committing the crime.”98 
 
 The Feldman Court recognized that a reasonable 
sentencing court could credit Feldman’s argument that he 
“did not intend any monetary loss to his creditors.”99  But 
                                                   
95 Id. at 215.  The district court in Feldman declined to 
decide if the real estate that the defendant owned with his 
wife was actually exempt from bankruptcy, “reasoning 
instead that Feldman lost the right to claim the exemption 
when he failed to disclose the property.”  Id.  
96 Id. at 221 (emphasis in original).   
97 Id. at 221–22 (alteration in original). 
98 Id. at 223.   
99 Id.  
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Feldman also stated that it would be “appropriate for the 
District Court to consider the reason why most people would 
conceal assets and determine that it is simply unbelievable 
that Feldman would hide over a million dollars in assets only 
[as he argued on appeal] to achieve a faster discharge.”100  
Whereas Feldman had argued that the government needed to 
affirmatively rebut his contention that he concealed assets 
only “to ‘speed along’ the [bankruptcy] process,”101 we 
“conclude[d] that intent [to short-change creditors] can be 
inferred from the fact that Feldman concealed a large amount 
of property.”102   
 
 Importantly, however, we did not say in Feldman that 
the concealment of large quantities of assets always proves a 
fraudster’s intent to short-change his creditors.  Instead, we 
emphasized that there were other facts tending to show that 
Feldman in particular intended to inflict such a loss.  We 
emphasized that, in addition to the real estate he owned with 
his wife, Feldman concealed two Jaguar vehicles “that were 
not even arguably exempt from bankruptcy.”103  In our view, 
this conduct supported the conclusion “that Feldman intended 
to inflict a loss in the amount of the entire debt from which he 
sought to be discharged.”104   
 
                                                   
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 222. 
102 Id. at 216. 
103 Id. at 223–24. 
104 Id. at 223.   
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 The parties disagree over how Feldman applies to the 
facts at hand.  Free contends that Feldman supports him 
because it focuses on a debtor’s intended pecuniary harm to 
creditors.  The government, by contrast, says that Feldman 
supports its view that district courts have wide discretion to 
consider “the many permutations of facts that arise when loss 
is at issue” and to assess “what the defendant ‘sought to gain 
from committing the crime.’”105  The government argues that, 
“[h]ad Free truly not intended a loss to any creditor, he had 
many opportunities to come forward, admit to his fraud and 
deceit, and set the record straight.”106  The government 
therefore urges us to interpret Free’s continued dishonesty as 
evidence that, as a matter of law, supports the conclusion that 
Free intended loss equal to the amount of debt that he sought 
to conceal. 
 
 The District Court, however, seemed to select a 
different approach and thus did not make a factual finding 
regarding the government’s view.  The government, both in 
its briefing and at oral argument, argues that the District 
Court drew the explicit inference that Free intended to cause 
pecuniary harm to his creditors, among other victims.107  
                                                   
105 Gov’t Br. at 55 (quoting Feldman, 338 F.3d at 223).   
106 Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
107 For example, the section heading for Part III.C.2 of the 
government’s brief states:  “The District Court Correctly 
Ruled, As A Matter Of Law, That Free Intended A Loss.”  
Gov’t Br. at 55.  It is worth noting that no citations to the 
record or to the District Court’s statements at Free’s 
sentencing hearing appear in that section of the brief.   
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Reviewing the record on appeal, we simply disagree.  The 
District Court relied primarily on the notion that Free harmed 
the judicial system by concealing assets.  We believe that 
rationale is inconsistent with the Guidelines and incompatible 
with Feldman.  Thus, we disagree with the District Court’s 
view that the concept of “loss” under the Guidelines is broad 
enough to cover injuries like abstract harm to the judiciary.  
In our view, “loss” has a narrower meaning—i.e., pecuniary 
harm suffered by or intended to be suffered by victims. 
 
 The government’s citations to cases from other circuits 
on this point are not persuasive.  While courts have 
occasionally treated the value of concealed assets as the 
amount of loss in bankruptcy fraud cases, they have done so 
in circumstances where it was clear that the debtor would be 
                                                                                                                  
 
Likewise, counsel for the government began her oral 
argument by stating:  “The question before the Court today is 
whether the District Court correctly found Michael Free 
intended and thought that his conduct would cause an 
injury—cause a financial injury—to his creditors.  The 
District Court said ‘yes,’ and that decision was correct.” Oral 
Arg. Recording at 13:29, available at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/ 
audio/15-2939USAvFree.mp3.  Having carefully scrutinized 
the District Court’s statements at sentencing, and its opinion 
regarding Free’s motion for bail pending appeal, we are not 
so certain that the District Court made such a finding. 
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unable to pay all of his creditors in full.108  These cases might 
support the government’s view if, at the time Free filed for 
bankruptcy, it was clear that Free’s liabilities exceeded his 
assets, or if Free had concealed so many assets that the 
creditors were at risk of not being paid.109  But the District 
Court did not make such a finding. 
 
 Instead, we draw guidance from our colleagues in the 
Seventh Circuit.  That court recently recognized that “the 
guidelines do not require a loss calculation greater than 
zero.”110  Rather, “[t]he loss determination is a special offense 
characteristic that increases the guidelines offense level” 
through “bonus punishment points, which express a 
reasonable estimation of the victim’s financial loss.”111  We 
agree with the proposition that the government is not entitled 
                                                   
108 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 29 F.3d 908, 913 n.4 
(4th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the claims of Walker’s creditors 
totalled [sic] $3,444,191 while only $17,111 ultimately was 
distributed to two creditors after liquidation”).   
109 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 557 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (“The district court observed that at the time of the 
concealment it was far from clear that there would be 
sufficient assets to pay the creditors in full . . . .  On that 
basis, the district court calculated the amount of intended loss 
as the value of the assets concealed by Hughes . . . .”).  
110 United States v. Yihao Pu, 814 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 
2016). 
111 Id. at 828–29 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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to a punitive loss calculation, even in cases involving fraud, 
absent evidence of actual or intended pecuniary loss.   
 
 It is true that the District Court stated at Free’s 
sentencing hearing “that it was certainly Mr. Free’s intention 
to conceal from the United States Bankruptcy Court and to 
cause a loss, to the extent that it was needed, materially in 
excess of a million dollars.”112  However, the District Court 
also stated, somewhat cryptically, that “Free had his reasons 
for both filing and persisting in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
[and] that Mr. Free had his reasons that were of value to him 
in not causing any of his lawyers to attempt to resolve the 
matter earlier.”113 
 
 In our view, this is something short of an explicit 
factual finding that Free intended to harm his creditors by 
concealing assets.  It is, at most, a finding that Free wanted to 
protect certain assets—especially his firearms—from the 
bankruptcy process.  In any event, we do not think that the 
District Court actually made an explicit factual finding as to 
whom Free intended to harm or the gain he intended to secure 
                                                   
112 App. Vol. V at 1122.   
113 Id. at 1123.   
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by committing the offense.114  Any ambiguity on this point is 
clarified by the District Court’s opinion regarding Free’s 
motion for bail pending appeal.  The District Court there said 
that “the principal basis for the sentence [it] imposed” was 
“harm[] [to] the integrity of the judicial process”—not 
pecuniary harm, actual or intended, to Free’s creditors, or 
what he sought to gain from committing the crime.115  
Feldman requires such a factual finding, and we thus remand 
to allow the District Court to determine what, if any, loss to 
creditors Free intended, or the gain he sought by committing 
the crime.116 
                                                   
114 At times, the government seems to suggest that we 
should review the entire record in order to conduct our own 
fact-finding about whether Free intended to cause pecuniary 
harm.  See, e.g., Gov’t Br. at 43 (“The full record, rather than 
Free’s preferred reliance on only parts of the record, 
establishes that the District Court had before it more than 
ample evidence to rule, as a matter of fact, that Free intended 
a loss.”).  We decline the government’s invitation.  It is true 
that we will generally not vacate a sentence “if the district 
court’s findings are ‘plausible in light of the record viewed in 
its entirety.’”  United States v. Barrie, 267 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985)).  But here, because we do not think 
that the District Court actually made an explicit factual 
finding as to whom Free intended to harm or the gain he 
sought to secure through the crime, there are no factual 
findings for us to review under the clear-error standard at all.   
115 Free, 2015 WL 8784738, at *2 (emphasis added). 
116 See Feldman, 338 F.3d at 221-23. 
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 We of course appreciate the concerns expressed by 
both the government and the District Court regarding the 
integrity of the judicial system.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) 
reflects, in part, this concern.  We also agree with the District 
Court that it is sensible to punish fraudsters who conceal 
assets of greater value more harshly than defendants who 
conceal assets of lesser value.  In the vast majority of cases, 
the loss calculation will have precisely this effect because, 
generally speaking, the reason defendants conceal assets in 
bankruptcy is to benefit themselves at the expense of their 
creditors.  But here, the District Court has not made a finding 
as to whether Free had such an intent, and the parties disagree 
on this point.  While we are sympathetic with the District 
Court’s desire to punish Free in a manner commensurate with 
his disrespect for the judiciary, we nonetheless conclude that 
inflating Free’s loss figure based on a theory of abstract harm 
to the judiciary is not an appropriate way to calibrate his 
sentence under the Guidelines. 
   
 This is not to say that Free will necessarily receive a 
lower sentence on remand.  It is true that the District Court 
has already calculated that, if it were to apply a zero-dollar 
loss figure, the Guidelines range on remand would be 6–12 
months on each count.117  But as we have already noted, the 
Guidelines embrace the view that an upward departure or 
variance may be appropriate when a defendant’s conduct 
results in extensive, albeit non-pecuniary, harm.118  We 
                                                   
117 Free, 2015 WL 8784738, at *5. 
118 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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appreciate that the notes speak of non-pecuniary harm in 
terms of injury to actual victims, such as “physical harm, 
psychological harm, or severe emotional trauma.”119  Free’s 
flouting of the bankruptcy system, his blatant disrespect for 
judicial authority, and his repeated dissembling while under 
oath are not analogous to these kinds of injuries.  But even at 
the most general level, the statutory sentencing factors require 
district courts to consider, among other things, “the need for 
the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense.”120  Moreover, the District Court 
may find it appropriate to depart on the basis that Free’s 
“conduct resulted in a significant disruption of a 
governmental function” to reflect Free’s flagrant disregard for 
the Trustee’s instructions, the Bankruptcy Court’s orders, and 
interference with the bankruptcy process.121  Free’s conduct 
may therefore be considered in favor of a sentence harsher 
than the one that would be suggested by the actual loss 
                                                   
119 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app. n. 20(A)(ii). 
120 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
121 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7 (“If the defendant's conduct resulted in 
a significant disruption of a governmental function, the court 
may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline 
range to reflect the nature and extent of the disruption and the 
importance of the governmental function affected.”).  See 
also United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 228 n.15 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“[W]e do not foreclose the district courts’ option to 
depart upward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 in appropriate cases of 
bankruptcy fraud . . . .”).  
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calculation.122  
 
 We leave it to the District Court to consider these 
issues on remand and to determine an appropriate sentence 
consistent with the statutory sentencing factors and the 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand this case for resentencing. 
                                                   
122 Cf. United States v. Lipscomb, 284 F. App’x 924, 928 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (affirming an above-Guidelines-range sentence for 
a bankruptcy fraudster whom the district court characterized 
as a “serial abuser of the judicial system” and in which the 
District Court noted that “I'm going to sentence you to a term 
of imprisonment above the sentencing guideline range 
because I believe you are outside the ordinary case here.”).  In 
addition, the government appeared confident at oral argument 
that it could show that Free actually did intend to cause 
pecuniary harm to his creditors.  See, e.g., Oral Arg. 
Recording, supra note 107, at 14:01 (“As a matter of fact . . . 
the only reason the creditors were paid 100% on the dollar is 
because the fraud was discovered and concealed assets were 
liquidated to pay off those creditors.”).  Moreover, tangible 
harm may include administrative expenses that the estate 
incurred as a result of Free’s actions.  See United States v. 
Edgar, 971 F.2d 89, 95 (8th Cir. 1992) (deeming it 
appropriate to consider in the calculation of intended loss “the 
foreseeable costs of administering the estate”). 
